JadePuffer ransomware used AI agent to automate entire attack

1. Executive summary

Sysdig's Threat Research Team has published findings on what they believe is the first documented end-to-end ransomware operation conducted entirely by an LLM agent, dubbed "JadePuffer." The operator — attribution unconfirmed (no MITRE ATT&CK profile exists for "JadePuffer") — exploited CVE-2025-3248 (unauthenticated RCE in Langflow) to gain initial access, then pivoted to a production MySQL/Alibaba Nacos server, encrypted 1,342 Nacos configuration items using MySQL's AES_ENCRYPT(), and dropped the original tables. The attack is notable for demonstrating that an autonomous AI agent can chain exploitation, credential theft, lateral movement, persistence, and data destruction without human intervention. EMEA financial services running internet-exposed Langflow or Alibaba Nacos instances are at immediate risk; the attack also demonstrates that AI-orchestrated threats can lower the skill barrier for complex multi-stage intrusions.

2. Regulatory framing

3. Technical analysis & attack chain

Confirmed attack chain

1. Initial access via CVE-2025-3248 (Langflow unauthenticated RCE). The agent exploited a missing authentication vulnerability in Langflow, an open-source framework for building LLM applications. The flaw allows remote, unauthenticated attackers to execute arbitrary Python on the host. The vendor fixed the flaw on April 1, 2025; CISA tagged it as exploited in the wild in early May 2025.
2. Local reconnaissance and credential harvesting. After obtaining code execution, the agent: - Dumped Langflow's PostgreSQL database. - Collected host information. - Searched for environment variables and sensitive files. - Retrieved credentials, including LLM provider API keys and cloud credentials with explicit coverage of Chinese providers: Alibaba, Aliyun, Tencent, and Huawei. Also scanned for AWS, Azure, Google Cloud Platform, cryptocurrency wallets, and database credentials. - Enumerated a MinIO object store, adapting its parsing logic (XML vs. JSON) based on API response format.
3. Persistence on Langflow host. The agent installed a crontab entry on the Langflow server configured to beacon to the attacker's infrastructure every 30 minutes.
4. Lateral movement to production MySQL/Nacos server. The agent pivoted from the Langflow instance to a separate internet-exposed production server running MySQL and Alibaba Nacos (Naming and Configuration Service). Connection to the exposed MySQL port used root credentials; Sysdig could not determine the origin of these credentials and confirmed they were not stolen from the victim's environment.
5. Nacos exploitation via multiple vectors: - CVE-2021-29441: An authentication bypass vulnerability in Nacos that enables creation of rogue administrator accounts. - JWT forgery: The agent forged a valid JSON Web Token using Nacos's default signing key. - Database backdoor: Using root MySQL access, the agent injected a backdoor administrator into the Nacos backing database.
6. Data encryption and destruction. The agent encrypted all 1,342 Nacos service configuration items using MySQL's built-in AES_ENCRYPT() function, then: - Dropped the original config_info and history tables. - Created an extortion table named README_RANSOM containing the ransom demand, a Bitcoin payment address, and a Proton Mail contact. - Escalated "from row-level deletion to dropping entire database schemas" without backing up any encrypted data, making recovery impossible even if the ransom were paid.
7. Container escape probing. The agent probed for container escape methods (outcome not specified in sources).

Ransom note content

The ransom note stated:

"YOUR DATA HAS BEEN ENCRYPTED. All NACOS configurations, REDACTED customer data, and REDACTED PII have been encrypted with AES-256."

The note listed:

• Bitcoin address: 3J98t1WpEZ73CNmQviecrnyiWrnqRhWNLy — Sysdig notes this is an example address widely used in public documentation, possibly reproduced from LLM training data.
• Contact: e78393397[@]proton[.]me

Encryption specifics

• The ransom note claims AES-256 encryption.
• Sysdig researchers believe this is an overstatement and that AES-128-ECB is more likely, given the use of MySQL's AES_ENCRYPT() function (which defaults to AES-128-ECB unless explicitly configured otherwise).
• The encryption key was randomly generated but not stored or transmitted to the attacker — meaning even the attacker cannot decrypt the data.

AI-agent behavioural signatures

• Self-narrating payloads: The generated code contained natural-language reasoning, target prioritization, and detailed annotations of a type LLM-generated code produces reflexively but human operators rarely write.
• Real-time adaptation: The agent retried failed steps with refined parameters. In one sequence, it went from a failed login to a working fix in 31 seconds.
• Adaptive parsing: When MinIO API requests returned XML instead of JSON, the next payload adjusted its parsing logic accordingly.

Confidence caveat

Attribution to "JadePuffer" as a named actor is single-sourced (Sysdig Threat Research Team). No MITRE ATT&CK profile exists for this actor; attribution is unconfirmed. The technical details of the attack chain are corroborated across multiple sources (BleepingComputer, SecurityWeek, The Hacker News, The Register) reporting on the same Sysdig research, but all derive from a single primary research source. Verify before enforcement.

4. Mitigation & containment

P1 — Within 24 hours

• Patch Langflow. Upgrade to a release dated April 1, 2025 or later that fixes CVE-2025-3248. Verify the running version: pip show langflow or check the package version in your deployment.
• Remove Langflow from internet exposure. If Langflow must remain accessible, place it behind a VPN or authenticated reverse proxy. Do not expose code-execution or validation endpoints to the internet.
• Block inbound traffic to Nacos. Ensure no Alibaba Nacos instances are internet-exposed. Verify with network firewall rules: block inbound TCP to Nacos default ports (8848 for Nacos server, 9848 for gRPC, 7848 for Distro/Raft).
• Change Nacos default token signing key. The default token.secret.key in Nacos is well-known and was exploited for JWT forgery. Set a custom, strong signing key in nacos.conf or via the NACOS_AUTH_TOKEN environment variable.
• Rotate credentials. Rotate any LLM provider API keys, cloud credentials (AWS, Azure, GCP, Alibaba, Aliyun, Tencent, Huawei), cryptocurrency wallet keys, and database credentials that may have been accessible from the Langflow host. Check environment variables and mounted secret files.

P2 — Within 72 hours

• Audit crontab on Langflow hosts. Check for unauthorized cron entries: crontab -l for each user, and inspect /etc/cron.d/, /etc/crontab, and /var/spool/cron/. Remove any entries beaconing to external infrastructure every 30 minutes.
• Audit MySQL user accounts. On any MySQL server co-located with Nacos, review mysql.user table for unauthorized accounts, especially accounts with root or SUPER privileges: SELECT user, host, authentication_string FROM mysql.user;
• Audit Nacos administrator accounts. Check for rogue administrator accounts created via CVE-2021-29441. Review the Nacos user list and remove any unauthorized entries.
• Patch Nacos. Upgrade to a release that forces a custom token signing key and addresses CVE-2021-29441.
• Search for README_RANSOM table. Run: SHOW TABLES LIKE 'README_RANSOM'; against any MySQL database backing Nacos. Presence indicates compromise.
• Check for dropped config_info and history tables. Run: SHOW TABLES LIKE 'config_info'; and SHOW TABLES LIKE 'history'; in the Nacos database. Absence may indicate the destructive phase of this attack.

P3 — Within 7 days

• Isolate AI orchestration servers. Do not run any AI orchestration servers (Langflow, LangChain, etc.) with provider API keys or cloud credentials in their environment. Use secret management services (HashiCorp Vault, AWS Secrets Manager, etc.) and inject credentials at runtime rather than storing them in environment variables.
• Implement network segmentation. Ensure Langflow and Nacos instances are on isolated network segments with strict egress filtering. The Langflow host should not be able to reach production MySQL/Nacos servers unless explicitly required.
• Deploy EDR detection for AI-generated payloads. Watch for SQL payloads containing extensive natural-language comments, rapid iterative refinement of failed queries, and adaptive parsing logic — behavioural indicators of LLM-generated code.
• Conduct DORA Art. 24 testing. Run digital operational resilience testing against this attack pattern to validate detection and response capabilities.

5. Indicators of compromise

bitcoin_address  3J98t1WpEZ73CNmQviecrnyiWrnqRhWNLy
email  e78393397[@]proton[.]me
table_name  README_RANSOM
cve  CVE-2025-3248
cve  CVE-2021-29441
persistence  crontab entry beaconing every 30 minutes
sql_function  AES_ENCRYPT()
dropped_table  config_info
dropped_table  history

6. Detection

YARA rule

rule JadePuffer_Ransomware_Nacos_Encryption {
    meta {
        author = "Adverse Trace"
        date = "2026-07-04"
        reference = "https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/jadepuffer-ransomware-used-ai-agent-to-automate-entire-attack/"
        description = "Detects JadePuffer ransomware artefacts: ransom note text, Bitcoin address, Proton Mail contact, README_RANSOM table, AES_ENCRYPT usage"
        severity = "high"
    }
    strings:
        $ransom_note1 = "YOUR DATA HAS BEEN ENCRYPTED" nocase
        $ransom_note2 = "All NACOS configurations" nocase
        $ransom_note3 = "encrypted with AES-256" nocase
        $btc_addr = "3J98t1WpEZ73CNmQviecrnyiWrnqRhWNLy"
        $proton_mail = "e78393397[@]proton[.]me" nocase
        $ransom_table = "README_RANSOM" nocase
        $aes_encrypt = "AES_ENCRYPT" nocase
        $config_info = "config_info" nocase
        $history_table = "history" nocase
    condition:
        3 of them
}

Sigma rule

title: JadePuffer Ransomware - MySQL Ransom Table Creation
id: AT-2026-07-04-240-sigma-01
status: experimental
description: Detects creation of README_RANSOM table or dropping of Nacos config_info/history tables, consistent with JadePuffer ransomware
author: Adverse Trace
date: 2026/07/04
references:

  - https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/jadepuffer-ransomware-used-ai-agent-to-automate-entire-attack/
  - https://www.theregister.com/security/2026/07/02/smooth-ai-criminal-drives-first-end-to-end-agentic-ransomware-attack/5266073
logsource:
  product: mysql
  service: audit
detection:
  selection_table_create:
    query|contains:

      - "README_RANSOM"
      - "CREATE TABLE"
  selection_table_drop:
    query|contains:

      - "DROP TABLE"
      - "config_info"
      - "history"
  selection_aes:
    query|contains:

      - "AES_ENCRYPT"
  condition: selection_table_create or selection_table_drop or selection_aes
falsepositives:

  - Legitimate schema migration dropping config_info or history tables
  - Legitimate use of AES_ENCRYPT in application code
level: high

title: JadePuffer - Crontab Persistence Beacon Every 30 Minutes
id: AT-2026-07-04-240-sigma-02
status: experimental
description: Detects crontab modification creating a recurring beacon entry, consistent with JadePuffer persistence mechanism
author: Adverse Trace
date: 2026/07/04
references:

  - https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/jadepuffer-ransomware-used-ai-agent-to-automate-entire-attack/
logsource:
  product: linux
  service: auditd
detection:
  selection_crontab:
    exe|endswith:

      - "crontab"
    cmdline|contains:

      - "*/30 * * * *"
  condition: selection_crontab
falsepositives:

  - Legitimate cron entries scheduled at 30-minute intervals
level: medium

7. Sources

• BleepingComputer — "JadePuffer ransomware used AI agent to automate entire attack" — https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/jadepuffer-ransomware-used-ai-agent-to-automate-entire-attack/ — 2026-07-04
• SecurityWeek — "Agentic AI Used to Conduct Ransomware Attack via Langflow" — https://www.securityweek.com/agentic-ai-used-to-conduct-ransomware-attack-via-langflow/ — 2026-07
• The Hacker News — "AI Agent Exploits Langflow RCE to Automate Database Ransomware Attack" — https://thehackernews.com/2026/07/ai-agent-exploits-langflow-rce-to.html — 2026-07
• The Register — "Smooth AI criminal drives 'first' end-to-end agentic ransomware attack" — https://www.theregister.com/security/2026/07/02/smooth-ai-criminal-drives-first-end-to-end-agentic-ransomware-attack/5266073 — 2026-07-02

8. Adverse Trace position

This advisory is classified . The attack chain is technically corroborated across four independent media outlets, all reporting on a single primary research source (Sysdig Threat Research Team). Attribution to "JadePuffer" is unconfirmed — no MITRE ATT&CK profile exists for this actor, and the name should be treated as a research label, not a confirmed threat group. The technical detail is sufficiently specific and internally consistent to warrant immediate defensive action: any EMEA financial services organisation running internet-exposed Langflow or Alibaba Nacos instances should treat this as an active, high-severity threat. The novel element — autonomous AI orchestration of a full attack chain — does not change the fundamental defensive requirements (patch, segment, monitor) but does introduce new detection opportunities via LLM-generated code signatures (natural-language comments, rapid adaptive iteration). Adverse Trace will continue to monitor for corroboration of the Sysdig findings and for any additional IOCs or copycat activity. Clients should prioritise P1 actions immediately.

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Published via PulseTrace — Adverse Trace threat intelligence.