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# OpenSSH SSHole flaw CVE-2026-123158 exploited for root access
- URL: https://f4n6.co.uk/security-feed/openssh-sshole-flaw-cve-2026-123158-exploited-for-root-access/
- Published: 2026-11-06T18:02:32.000Z
- Updated: 2026-11-06T18:02:32.000Z
- Author: Jeff Davies
- Tags: #security-feed, CVE-2026-123158

## 1\. Executive summary

CVE-2026-123158, nicknamed SSHole, is an authentication bypass in OpenSSH builds that use the musl C library with PAM disabled, and it is being exploited in the wild. Previdian recorded eight attempts from a single Japan-based address, 89.116.89\[.\]18, and confirmed successful root access on a honeypot running real Alpine Linux and OpenSSH; the first attempt arrived less than nine hours after CVE publication. NVD scores the flaw 8.1 HIGH, EPSS puts exploitation probability at 1%, and CISA has not added it to KEV. The risk to EMEA financial services sits in Alpine-based container images and cloud images, where a passwordless default account with passwordless doas gives an unauthenticated remote attacker root. Exposure depends entirely on whether an estate runs musl builds without PAM and with password authentication enabled; glibc and PAM-enabled builds are not affected.

## 2\. Regulatory framing

| Article                                                                     | Trigger (the fact in this item)                                                                                                                                                            | Practical impact                                                                                                |
| --------------------------------------------------------------------------- | ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ | --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- |
| DORA Art. 24: digital operational resilience testing — general requirements | The flaw is trivial to exploit and was attacked within nine hours of disclosure, so internet-facing SSH on musl builds needs testing against the bypass rather than assumption of control. | Include an authentication-bypass test against musl OpenSSH builds in resilience testing, and record the result. |
| NIS2 Art. 21(2)(d): supply chain security measures                          | Alpine Linux is the standard C library base for a large share of container images, and the affected component arrives through image supply chains rather than direct deployment.           | Extend supplier and image-provenance checks to the OpenSSH and musl build inside images you pull.               |

## 3\. Technical analysis & attack chain

The flaw lets a remote attacker authenticate to accounts that should never accept a password, on Linux systems running OpenSSH before 10.6p2 built against musl libc with PAM disabled. OpenSSH 10.6p2, released 5 November 2026, fixes it.

Confirmed steps, from Previdian's honeypot and the researcher's writeup:

1. The attacker reaches the SSH port of a musl-based host with password authentication enabled (the OpenSSH default).
2. The attacker supplies a password longer than 256 characters to a target account whose password field in /etc/shadow contains only an asterisk. SecurityWeek and The Register put the working range at 257 to 1024 characters; ANSSI describes a login with two passwords, the second strictly longer than 256 and shorter than 1024 characters.
3. sshd hashes the supplied password. musl's crypt() refuses SHA-256 and SHA-512 passwords longer than 256 bytes and returns "*" on failure, which matches the stored "*", so sshd accepts the login.
4. Previdian observed the attacker run reconnaissance through non-interactive SSH sessions: id, uname and hostname.
5. On Alpine's official AWS and Azure images the default alpine user has passwordless doas, which yields root. Previdian confirmed root access on its honeypot.

The mechanism has two preconditions beyond the musl build: at least one account with only "*" in its password field, and another local account that has a real password hash for sshd to borrow salt from. Key-only users created without a password and users pulled from a directory service through musl-nscd fit the target profile, per SOCRadar. Root has shipped with "*" since around Alpine 3.16, but OpenSSH's default PermitRootLogin keeps direct root login out of reach unless an administrator changed it; SOCRadar calls indirect root access the larger concern.

The root cause is a collision between two old design choices. In 2016 OpenSSH changed sshd to hash a supplied password against a borrowed salt even when an account has no usable hash, to close a username-enumeration timing side channel (CVE-2016-6210). Since 2012 musl's crypt() has returned "\*" for over-length SHA-256 and SHA-512 passwords. The two behaviours combine into an authentication bypass. Kültekin tested builds in every combination he could construct and threw some 17,600 unusual login attempts at them; only the musl build without PAM accepted logins it should have refused.

Affected systems named in reporting: Alpine Linux (default openssh-server package), OpenWrt, Buildroot and Yocto, plus, in Kültekin's words, "a lot of the docker images you've pulled". Risky Business states the flaw affects OpenSSH musl versions released over the past decade.

Attribution and intent are unconfirmed. No source names an actor, and the eight attempts come from one IP address with no further attribution. The claim that attackers are getting faster with the aid of AI is Ryan Dewhurst's opinion, not a finding. Kültekin's remark that he used "agent swarms" refers to his own research tooling, not to the attacker.

## 4\. Mitigation & containment

P1 within 24h

- Inventory every host and container image running OpenSSH built against musl without PAM. Check Alpine, OpenWrt, Buildroot and Yocto builds first, then pulled container images. Upgrade OpenSSH to 10.6p2 or later, the fixed release named by OpenSSH and ANSSI.
- Where upgrading is not possible, set password authentication off in sshd\_config and restart the SSH daemon. The Register and ANSSI both give this as the workaround; ANSSI adds disabling the service entirely as the fallback.
- Hunt for exploitation with the check ANSSI publishes. As root: `awk -F : '$2 == "*" {print $1}' /etc/shadow | xargs -r -I{} grep "Accepted password for {}" /var/log/messages` Any hit is a login to a password-disabled account and needs incident handling.
- Block 89.116.89\[.\]18 at the perimeter and review SSH logs for sessions from it.

P2 within 72h

- Review whether PermitRootLogin has been changed from the default on musl hosts, since the default keeps direct root login out of reach.
- Confirm the alpine default user on AWS and Azure images does not retain passwordless doas where it is not required.
- Apply Alpine Linux security updates for openssh-server where Alpine is in use.

P3 within 7 days

- Add an authentication-bypass test for musl OpenSSH builds to resilience testing.
- Add image provenance checks so musl-based base images are identified before deployment.

## 5\. Indicators of compromise

| type | value            | confidence                      | source            |
| ---- | ---------------- | ------------------------------- | ----------------- |
| ipv4 | 89.116.89\[.\]18 | high (single source, Previdian) | Help Net Security |

```iocs
ipv4  89.116.89[.]18

```

The IP address is single-sourced to Previdian; verify before enforcing a block beyond perimeter logging.

Behavioural indicators

| behaviour                                                               | where to observe                 | confidence                                                                     |
| ----------------------------------------------------------------------- | -------------------------------- | ------------------------------------------------------------------------------ |
| Successful password login to an account with "\*" in /etc/shadow        | /var/log/messages, sshd auth log | high (ANSSI)                                                                   |
| Non-interactive SSH sessions running id, uname and hostname in sequence | sshd logs, process accounting    | medium (single source, Previdian)                                              |
| SSH authentication with a password longer than 256 characters           | sshd debug logs                  | medium (derived from the mechanism described by SecurityWeek and The Register) |

## 6\. Detection

```yaml
title: SSH Login to Password-Disabled Account
id: 7c1e4f2a-sshole-2026
status: experimental
author: Adverse Trace
date: 2026/11/06
references:

  - https://www.cert.cyber.gouv.fr/alerte/CERTFR-2026-ALE-015/
description: Detects successful password authentication for accounts whose /etc/shadow entry holds only an asterisk, the SSHole bypass signature.
logsource:
  product: linux
  service: sshd
detection:
  selection:
    message|contains: 'Accepted password for'
  condition: selection
falsepositives:

  - Legitimate password logins to accounts that do have a hash; correlate against /etc/shadow entries holding only "*".
level: high

```

The Sigma rule flags password logins for correlation against the ANSSI account list; the awk command in §4 produces the definitive match. No file artefacts are given in the sources, so no YARA rule is emitted.

## CVE assessment

1 referenced CVE

| CVE                                                                                | CVSS     | Exploited | EPSS | Summary                                                                                                                          |
| ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------- | -------- | --------- | ---- | -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- |
| [CVE-2026-123158](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-123158?ref=f4n6.co.uk) | 8.1 High | —         | 1%   | sshd in OpenSSH before 10.6p2 on Linux, when musl libc is used without PAM, lacks a workaround for a password authentication by… |

## 7\. Sources

- The Hacker News, Hackers Target OpenSSH SSHole Flaw Within Hours of Disclosure, Gain Root on Honeypot, https://thehackernews.com/2026/11/hackers-exploited-openssh-sshole-flaw.html, 2026-11-06
- Help Net Security, OpenSSH flaw exploited in the wild just hours after disclosure (CVE-2026-123158), https://www.helpnetsecurity.com/2026/11/06/openssh-sshole-cve-2026-123158-exploitation/, 2026-11-06
- Risky Business News, Risky Bulletin: Some OpenSSH instances take any password longer than 256 characters, https://news.risky.biz/risky-bulletin-some-openssh-instances-take-any-password-longer-than-256-characters/
- SecurityWeek, OpenSSH Rushes Patches for 'SSHole' Authentication Bypass, https://www.securityweek.com/openssh-rushes-patches-for-sshole-authentication-bypass/
- The Register, Get root on a musl Linux system by slamming it with an overly long password, https://www.theregister.com/security/2026/11/05/get-root-on-a-musl-linux-system-by-slamming-it-with-an-overly-long-password/5307910, 2026-11-05
- ANSSI CERT-FR, Vulnérabilité dans OpenSSH, https://www.cert.cyber.gouv.fr/alerte/CERTFR-2026-ALE-015/, 2026-11-05

## 8\. Adverse Trace position

Adverse Trace assesses CVE-2026-123158 as 8.1 HIGH per NVD, not in CISA KEV, with EPSS at 1%; exploitation is confirmed by Previdian on a honeypot but the observed activity is eight attempts from one address, so this is early, low-volume exploitation rather than a campaign. Client impact is concentrated in estates running Alpine or other musl-based images with password authentication enabled, where the bypass gives root without credentials; glibc and PAM-enabled builds are not exposed. The exploitation evidence and the source IP are single-sourced to Previdian and should be verified before enforcement. We will track KEV status and further exploitation reporting, and we recommend clients complete the P1 inventory and upgrade to 10.6p2 or disable password authentication within 24 hours.

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[Read the original source →](https://thehackernews.com/2026/11/hackers-exploited-openssh-sshole-flaw.html?ref=f4n6.co.uk)

*Published via PulseTrace — Adverse Trace threat intelligence.*