1. Executive summary
Cisco Talos has published research on a financially motivated cluster it tracks as UAT-12643, whose toolset combines a Go-based Overlord RAT, a Python infostealer labelled "Good Game" version 1.1.2, and a C++ cryptocurrency clipboard hijacker. Talos assesses with low confidence that UAT-12643 is a North Korea-aligned APT based on TTP overlaps with known North Korean actors; UAT-12643 has no MITRE ATT&CK profile, so the attribution is unconfirmed. The payload's file-harvesting keyword list covers English, French, Spanish and Portuguese file names, and Talos states the actor is potentially targeting victims in Europe; a financial statement decoy PDF points at finance and accounting staff. No CVE is associated with this campaign and no exploitation of a software vulnerability is described. The risk to EMEA financial services is credential and session theft against finance, accounting and call-centre staff, not remote code execution against an internet-facing service.
2. Regulatory framing
| Article | Trigger (the fact in this item) | Practical impact |
|---|---|---|
| DORA Art. 17: ICT-related incident management process | The Overlord RAT's WinRE persistence survives a "Reset this PC" operation and its kill flag triggers a CRITICAL_PROCESS_DIED BSoD on termination, so standard reimage and process-kill steps do not clear it. | Incident response runbooks need a recovery path that does not rely on the Windows reset function, and a documented procedure for handling a host that crashes when the implant is killed. |
| DORA Art. 28: ICT third-party risk — general principles | Stolen archives leave the estate through gofile.io and Discord webhooks rather than an actor C2, so exfiltration traverses third-party cloud services outside the firm's ICT provider inventory. | Egress policy and third-party risk review must account for upload and webhook traffic to consumer file-sharing and messaging platforms. |
3. Technical analysis & attack chain
Talos observed three initial access methods instrumented as Windows shortcut (LNK) files, HTA files and MSBuild XML files. How the actor delivers these files to victims is not stated in public reporting.
- A weaponised LNK impersonates a PDF with the standard Windows document icon and runs
MpCmdRun.exewith the-DownloadFileargument to fetch the payload. MpCmdRun.exe is a signed Microsoft binary, so the download passes application allowlisting. The payload is saved asRuntimeBroker.exeand the console window is minimised. - A second LNK uses a double-extension file name and the Microsoft Edge PDF icon, and runs
certutil -urlcache -fas a download one-liner disguised as a certificate cache update. Talos states both shortcuts were built on the same machine,win-8oa3ccqae4d. - A weaponised HTA runs under
mshta.exe; its JavaScript usesMSXML2.ServerXMLHTTPto fetch the payload as raw binary andADODB.Streamto write it to%TEMP%\s.exe, then executes it with the window hidden. - An MSBuild project file named
dl.xmlcarries an inline C# CodeTaskFactory task. Run viamsbuild.exe, it compiles and executes the C# in memory with no downloader executable written to disk, and downloads using a spoofed Microsoft BITS/7.8 User-Agent.
Talos also recovered the actor's LNK generation script from the exposed staging directory. It takes a payload URL and an icon type (PDF, Word or Windows Update) and produces a COM-based LNK with spoofed, hidden execution.
Staging infrastructure. Malicious files were hosted at 41[.]216[.]188[.]11 on a Flask file-delivery service on port 8000 with resumable byte-range download support. The server's root folder was exposed to the internet, which gave Talos the toolset and the C2 port map below.
| Port | Service | Payload file names |
|---|---|---|
| 8000 | Flask file-drop (HTTP) | Payload.exe, MyApp2.exe, HTA files |
| 5173 | Overlord RAT WebSocket C2 | Ovl.exe, Client.exe |
| 5656 | Python stealer TCP C2 | Ova.exe, MyApp2.exe |
| 5959 | Python stealer TCP C2 | Microsip-config.exe, microsip-config1.exe |
Overlord RAT. The variant is a modular Windows RAT compiled from Go. It checks that it is running with administrative privilege, acquires SeDebugPrivilege, then calls NtSetInformationProcess directly to set the ProcessBreakOnTermination information class to 1 on its own handle. The kernel then treats the process as critical: a forced termination halts the system with a BSoD and stop code CRITICAL_PROCESS_DIED. The RAT also detects in-memory execution to suppress forensic artefacts in sandboxes.
Persistence has two paths. The primary is a registry autorun entry under the current user hive with a randomised value name pointing to the RAT binary in the Network folder of the local user profile application data folder. The secondary is pre-boot persistence through the Windows Recovery Environment OEM script path: the RAT removes any previous copy, creates %TARGETOSDRIVE%\Recovery\OEM\, generates a random 20-character file name, writes its own binary there, and wraps the launch command in a .bat file:
cmd.exe /c start %TARGETOSDRIVE%\Recovery\OEM\"random_stub_name"
%TARGETOSDRIVE% resolves only inside WinRE, so the command is built for recovery time. The RAT backs up the existing WinRE reset configuration, then creates or patches ResetConfig.xml to register the batch scripts as OEM tasks. A "Reset this PC" then executes the RAT before restoring the OS.
The RAT exposes 35 commands over its C2 channel: keystroke capture via GetAsyncKeyState, webcam, microphone, desktop audio and screen capture; directory listing and creation, file read, write, delete, copy, move, recursive search, upload, download and compression; process enumeration and termination; arbitrary command and script execution with console output streamed to C2; a reverse SOCKS proxy tunnel for operator TCP traffic into the victim network; and HTTP plugin downloads with reflective DLL injection at runtime.
Solana C2 discovery. The RAT embeds AES-256 encrypted C2 URLs in Solana Memo Program transactions. It calls the Solana getSignatures JSON-RPC method for the actor-controlled wallet, then getTransaction with jsonParsed encoding for each signature, and walks every instruction looking for a data string exactly 43 characters long, the fixed length of a Base58-encoded WebSocket URL after AES-256 encryption. Instructions of any other length, including legitimate Memo transactions, are skipped. The actor posts one transaction from the controlled wallet to move the C2 address, and every deployed RAT picks it up on its next discovery cycle. Talos notes the technique was first reported in March 2026 in use by the Lazarus APT group through Node.js, and that Overlord RAT with Solana hosting has also been used by other actors as reported by external researchers in October 2026.
Good Game stealer. The payload is a publicly available Python infostealer labelled "Good Game (version 1.1.2)" by CirqueiraDev; UAT-12643 is not the developer. It is packaged with PyInstaller from Python 3.12.0 into a self-contained Windows executable split between final_build.pyc (launcher, decoy interface, reverse-shell client) and kora.pyc (harvesting logic). The launcher hides its console via GetConsoleWindow() and ShowWindow() and renders a tkinter Notepad-style GUI while malicious threads run as daemons. Before collection it checks the OS is Windows via platform.system(), tests connectivity with an HTTP GET to Google (writing a skipped file to the temp directory on failure), and runs five sandbox detection checks; any trigger causes a silent exit.
The decoy opens a PDF-hosted document in the default browser once per machine, storing url_opened_<hash>.flag in the temp directory keyed on an MD5 of the URL. Persistence is a HKCU\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run value named Zoipers pointing at the executable's absolute path, plus a copy of the executable in %APPDATA%\Microsoft\Windows\Start Menu\Programs\Startup\. During operation it sets DisableTaskMgr=1 under HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Policies\System via RegSetValueExW and restores it to zero after exfiltration.
Harvesting covers 23 Chromium-family and Firefox-based browsers, Discord tokens from LevelDB stores across Discord clients and over 19 Chromium-based browsers (plain-text and dQw4w9WgXcQ:-prefixed encrypted tokens, decrypted with the browser master key and validated against the Discord API for profile, payment methods, gift codes and MFA status), ROBLOSECURITY cookies validated against the Roblox API, a system profile written to system_infos.txt with geolocation from ipwhois.app, a full-monitor screenshot and one webcam frame, session data from 21 cryptocurrency wallets (including Exodus, Electrum, Ledger Live, Trezor Suite, Atomic Wallet, Trust Wallet, Coinbase and Binance) and four game launchers (Steam, Riot Games, Epic Games, Rockstar Games).
A file sweep covers Desktop, Downloads, Documents, Pictures, Videos, OneDrive root and %APPDATA%\Microsoft\Windows\Recent, requiring both a 45-extension allowlist and a keyword allowlist in English, French, Spanish and Portuguese matched against the file's base name. Keywords cover 2FA backup codes, mnemonic seed phrases, wallet application names, password file naming, banking and payment terms, private key and recovery phrase labels, Discord tokens, Telegram session identifiers, and labels such as secret, vault, backup, admin and root. Matched files are suffixed with a random four-digit number. The archive is a ZIP_DEFLATED file in the temp directory named SK_ plus eight random characters, structured into Screenshot/, Webcam/, Session Files/Wallets/, Session Files/Game Launchers/, Session Files/Apps/Telegram/ and Interesting Files/, with browser outputs named like Passwords (N).txt.
Exfiltration bypasses the C2. The archive is POSTed to hxxps[:]//upload[.]gofile[.]io/uploadFile, which returns a download link, and a Discord webhook receives a message with the victim's hostname, username, machine architecture, OS version and OS release label plus the link. The stealer then deletes the local ZIP and temporary PNGs.
Clipboard hijacker. A compact Windows x64 C++ executable with no network component. Wallet addresses are XOR-encrypted in the binary's data section. It resolves API addresses dynamically, creates the mutex UuuRjinBZPBMIjnc, and checks the machine name for VBOX, VMWARE, QEMU and SANDBOX. It copies itself to %APPDATA%\MsgEdgeUpdate.exe with FILE_ATTRIBUTE_HIDDEN and FILE_ATTRIBUTE_SYSTEM, and adds a Run key value named MsgEdgeUpdate. It polls the clipboard every 500 milliseconds, fingerprints the address format, and overwrites a detected cryptocurrency address with the XOR-decrypted attacker address.
Caveat. The North Korea attribution is Talos's own, stated at low confidence, and rests on TTP overlap. UAT-12643 has no MITRE ATT&CK profile. The link to Lazarus is that Lazarus was first reported using the Solana memo technique in March 2026, not that Lazarus is operating this campaign. Talos states other actors also use Overlord RAT with Solana hosting. Treat the attribution as unconfirmed.
4. Mitigation & containment
P1, within 24 hours
- Block
41[.]216[.]188[.]11and ports 8000, 5173, 5656 and 5959 to that host at the perimeter and on endpoint firewalls. - Block or alert on POST requests to
upload[.]gofile[.]io/uploadFileand on Discord webhook POSTs from servers and workstations that have no business need for them. - Hunt for
MpCmdRun.exewith-DownloadFile,certutil -urlcache -f,mshta.exeloading HTA content, andmsbuild.exeexecutingdl.xml. These are the four confirmed execution paths. - Search for
RuntimeBroker.exeand%TEMP%\s.exeoutside their expected locations, and for%APPDATA%\MsgEdgeUpdate.exe. - Check
HKCU\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Runfor the valueZoipersand for randomised value names pointing into the Network folder of the user's application data, and for a value namedMsgEdgeUpdate. - Check
%APPDATA%\Microsoft\Windows\Start Menu\Programs\Startup\for a copy of the running stealer executable. - Check
%TARGETOSDRIVE%\Recovery\OEM\for a randomly named 20-character executable and.batfiles, and inspectResetConfig.xmlfor appended OEM tasks. Do not kill a suspected Overlord RAT process on a production host: termination triggers a BSoD withCRITICAL_PROCESS_DIED. Isolate the host and rebuild it. - Reset credentials and revoke sessions for any user with a
ZoipersRun value, a Startup-folder copy, or aSK_archive in the temp directory. Treat Discord tokens, browser-stored passwords, cryptocurrency wallet seeds and game-launcher sessions as compromised. - Search the temp directory for
url_opened_<hash>.flagandskipped, which indicate stealer execution.
P2, within 72 hours
- Remove the Windows "Reset this PC" option from standard recovery guidance for affected builds until
ResetConfig.xmland the OEM directory are verified clean, because the RAT re-executes from WinRE during a reset. - Restrict
mshta.exe,msbuild.exeandcertutil.exeexecution to signed, approved use through application control. The LNK technique relies on signed Microsoft binaries, so allowlisting alone does not stop it; add argument-level rules for-DownloadFileand-urlcache. - Block LNK files arriving by email and web download, and alert on LNK files whose icon resolves to a PDF or Windows Update icon.
- Add the ClamAV signatures and Snort2/Snort3 rules Talos published alongside the report. Talos lists them in the post and hosts indicators in its GitHub repository; pull them from there rather than from this advisory.
P3, within 7 days
- Review egress for consumer file-sharing and messaging platforms across the estate, and add gofile.io and Discord webhooks to the third-party inventory used for DORA Art. 28 review.
- Brief finance, accounting and call-centre staff on the financial statement PDF lure, the Viber trojanized installer lure and the microsip lure, since these are the named themes.
- Confirm endpoint telemetry captures clipboard writes and
DisableTaskMgrregistry changes, and alert onDisableTaskMgr=1outside a change window.
No CVE is associated with this campaign and no vendor fix applies. The mitigations above are configuration and detection controls, not patches.
5. Indicators of compromise
| type | value | confidence | source |
|---|---|---|---|
| ipv4 | 41[.]216[.]188[.]11 | high | Cisco Talos |
| domain | upload[.]gofile[.]io | high | Cisco Talos |
| domain | gofile[.]io | high | Cisco Talos |
| mutex | UuuRjinBZPBMIjnc | high | Cisco Talos |
| file | %APPDATA%\MsgEdgeUpdate.exe | high | Cisco Talos |
| file | %TEMP%\s.exe | high | Cisco Talos |
| file | dl.xml | high | Cisco Talos |
| file | final_build.pyc | high | Cisco Talos |
| file | kora.pyc | high | Cisco Talos |
| file | RuntimeBroker.exe | medium | Cisco Talos |
| registry | HKCU\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run value Zoipers | high | Cisco Talos |
| registry | HKCU\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run value MsgEdgeUpdate | high | Cisco Talos |
| registry | HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Policies\System DisableTaskMgr=1 | high | Cisco Talos |
| path | %TARGETOSDRIVE%\Recovery\OEM\ | high | Cisco Talos |
| path | %APPDATA%\Microsoft\Windows\Start Menu\Programs\Startup\ | high | Cisco Talos |
| hostname | win-8oa3ccqae4d | medium | Cisco Talos |
RuntimeBroker.exe is a legitimate Windows process name; only treat it as an indicator outside its normal system location. win-8oa3ccqae4d is the build machine for the LNK files, not a victim indicator.
ipv4 41[.]216[.]188[.]11
domain upload[.]gofile[.]io
domain gofile[.]io
mutex UuuRjinBZPBMIjnc
file %APPDATA%\MsgEdgeUpdate.exe
file %TEMP%\s.exe
file dl.xml
file final_build.pyc
file kora.pyc
registry HKCU\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run Zoipers
registry HKCU\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run MsgEdgeUpdate
registry HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Policies\System DisableTaskMgr=1
path %TARGETOSDRIVE%\Recovery\OEM\
path %APPDATA%\Microsoft\Windows\Start Menu\Programs\Startup\
hostname win-8oa3ccqae4d
No file hashes are published in the source text; Talos hosts them in its GitHub repository linked from the report.
Behavioural indicators
| behaviour | where to observe | confidence |
|---|---|---|
MpCmdRun.exe invoked with -DownloadFile writing RuntimeBroker.exe |
process creation and file write telemetry | high |
certutil -urlcache -f used to fetch a payload |
process command line | high |
mshta.exe fetching binary content via MSXML2.ServerXMLHTTP and writing %TEMP%\s.exe |
process and file telemetry | high |
msbuild.exe compiling an inline C# task from dl.xml with no intermediate executable |
process creation, .NET assembly load | high |
| Outbound WebSocket to port 5173 and TCP to ports 5656 and 5959 | network flow logs | high |
Solana JSON-RPC getSignatures and getTransaction calls from an endpoint |
proxy and DNS logs | high |
DisableTaskMgr set to 1 then back to 0 |
registry auditing | high |
| Clipboard write followed by a cryptocurrency address change | EDR clipboard telemetry | medium |
Process termination causing a CRITICAL_PROCESS_DIED BSoD |
system event log | high |
6. Detection
rule UAT12643_GoodGame_Overlord_ClipboardHijacker
{
meta:
author = "Adverse Trace"
date = "2026-11-18"
reference = "https://blog.talosintelligence.com/uat-12643-suspected-north-korea-aligned-actor-blends-blockchain-resilience-with-targeted-infostealing/"
description = "Detects Good Game stealer, Overlord RAT and UAT-12643 clipboard hijacker artefacts"
strings:
$gg1 = "final_build.pyc" ascii wide
$gg2 = "kora.pyc" ascii wide
$gg3 = "Zoipers" ascii wide
$gg4 = "url_opened_" ascii wide
$gg5 = "system_infos.txt" ascii wide
$gg6 = "upload.gofile.io/uploadFile" ascii wide
$gg7 = "dQw4w9WgXcQ:" ascii wide
$gg8 = "ROBLOSECURITY" ascii wide
$ov1 = "NtSetInformationProcess" ascii wide
$ov2 = "ProcessBreakOnTermination" ascii wide
$ov3 = "getSignatures" ascii wide
$ov4 = "getTransaction" ascii wide
$ov5 = "jsonParsed" ascii wide
$ov6 = "ResetConfig.xml" ascii wide
$ov7 = "%TARGETOSDRIVE%\\Recovery\\OEM\\" ascii wide
$ch1 = "UuuRjinBZPBMIjnc" ascii wide
$ch2 = "MsgEdgeUpdate" ascii wide
$ch3 = "VBOX" ascii wide
$ch4 = "VMWARE" ascii wide
condition:
uint16(0) == 0x5A4D and
(
(2 of ($gg*)) or
(2 of ($ov*)) or
(2 of ($ch*))
)
}
title: UAT-12643 Overlord RAT and Good Game stealer execution
id: 7c1e4a92-3b6d-4f18-9a2e-5d0b8c7f1e34
status: experimental
description: Detects confirmed UAT-12643 execution paths, persistence and C2 ports
references:
- https://blog.talosintelligence.com/uat-12643-suspected-north-korea-aligned-actor-blends-blockchain-resilience-with-targeted-infostealing/
author: Adverse Trace
date: 2026/11/18
logsource:
category: process_creation
product: windows
detection:
selection_mpcmdrun:
Image|endswith: '\MpCmdRun.exe'
CommandLine|contains: '-DownloadFile'
selection_certutil:
Image|endswith: '\certutil.exe'
CommandLine|contains|all:
- '-urlcache'
- '-f'
selection_mshta:
Image|endswith: '\mshta.exe'
selection_msbuild:
Image|endswith: '\msbuild.exe'
CommandLine|contains: 'dl.xml'
selection_winre:
CommandLine|contains: '\Recovery\OEM\'
condition: 1 of selection_*
fields:
- Image
- CommandLine
- ParentImage
falsepositives:
- Legitimate Defender signature updates using MpCmdRun.exe
- Software deployment using msbuild.exe project files
level: high
Add a second Sigma rule on registry modification for DisableTaskMgr set to 1 and for Run-key values named Zoipers or MsgEdgeUpdate; the values are in §5.
Threat actor context
Lazarus Group · G0032 · aka Labyrinth Chollima, HIDDEN COBRA, Guardians of Peace, ZINC, NICKEL ACADEMY
Lazarus Group is a North Korean state-sponsored cyber threat group attributed to the Reconnaissance General Bureau (RGB). Lazarus Group has been active since at least 2009 and is reportedly responsible for the November 2014 destructive wiper attack on Sony Pictures Entertainment, identified by Novetta as part of Operation Blockbuster. …
No MITRE ATT&CK profile for: UAT-12643.
7. Sources
- Cisco Talos, "UAT-12643: Suspected North Korea-aligned actor blends blockchain resilience with targeted infostealing", https://blog.talosintelligence.com/uat-12643-suspected-north-korea-aligned-actor-blends-blockchain-resilience-with-targeted-infostealing/, 2026-11-18.
8. Adverse Trace position
Adverse Trace assesses this as a moderate-severity, financially motivated credential-theft campaign rather than a vulnerability exploit: no CVE is involved, no CISA KEV entry applies, and no exploitation of an internet-facing service is described. The material risk to EMEA financial services is theft of browser credentials, Discord and game-launcher sessions, cryptocurrency wallet seeds and keyword-matched finance documents from staff endpoints, with the European targeting signal resting on a four-language file-name keyword list and a financial statement decoy, which is Talos's inference from payload design, not observed victim data. The North Korea attribution is Talos's, at low confidence, and UAT-12643 has no MITRE ATT&CK profile; we treat it as unconfirmed and will not attribute activity to Lazarus on the strength of a shared Solana technique. The WinRE persistence and the BSoD kill flag are the two facts that change response: a host carrying Overlord RAT cannot be cleaned by a Windows reset and cannot be safely killed in place. We will pull the ClamAV and Snort signatures and the hash set from Talos's GitHub repository, add them to our detection content, and reissue this advisory if Talos raises its attribution confidence or publishes victim telemetry.
Published via PulseTrace — Adverse Trace threat intelligence.